<noframes id="vfxvr">

    <track id="vfxvr"></track>

      <span id="vfxvr"></span>

          ATT&CK-CN V1.01 Last Update: 2019-11 [返回索引頁]

          譯者: 林妙倩(清華大學網絡研究院網絡空間安全實習生)、戴亦侖(賽寧網安) 原創翻譯作品,如果需要轉載請取得翻譯作者同意。

          數據來源:ATT&CK Matrices

          原文: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484

          術語表: /attack/glossary

          組策略修改

          攻擊者可能會修改組策略對象(GPO),以顛覆域的預期的自由訪問控制,通常是為了提升域的特權。

          組策略允許集中管理Active Directory(AD)中的用戶和計算機設置。GPO是用于組策略設置的容器,該組策略設置由存儲在可預測網絡路徑中的文件組成\\SYSVOL\\Policies\。

          像AD中的其他對象一樣,GPO具有與其關聯的訪問控制。默認情況下,域中的所有用戶帳戶都具有讀取GPO的權限??梢詫PO訪問控制權限(例如寫訪問權限)委派給域中的特定用戶或組。

          惡意GPO修改可用于實施計劃任務(T1053),禁用安全工具(T1089),遠程文件復制(T1105),創建帳戶(T1136),服務執行(T1035)等。由于GPO可以控制AD環境中的眾多用戶和計算機設置,因此,這種GPO濫用可能會導致大量潛在的攻擊??赏ㄟ^修改GPO設置(在本例中為修改)New-GPOImmediateTask來利用公開可用的腳本(例如)來自動執行惡意的計劃任務(T1053)\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml。在某些情況下,對手可能會修改特定的用戶權限,例如SeEnableDelegationPrivilege(在中設置)\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf,以實現對域的完全控制的微妙的AD后門,因為在對手的控制下的用戶帳戶便可以修改GPO。

          Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain.

          Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\SYSVOL\\Policies\.

          Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.

          Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement Scheduled Task, Disabling Security Tools, Remote File Copy, Create Account, Service Execution and more Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse. Publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task(1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying \Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml. In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in \MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs

          ID(標識號): T1484

          策略: 防御閃避

          平臺: Windows

          所需權限: 管理員,用戶

          數據源: Windows事件日志

          繞過防御: 系統訪問控制,文件系統訪問控制

          程序示例

          名稱 描述
          Empire(S0363) Empire(S0363)可以New-GPOImmediateTask用來修改GPO,該GPO將安裝并執行惡意的Scheduled Task(T1053)
          Name Description
          Empire(S0363) Empire(S0363) can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a maliciouScheduled Task(T1053)

          緩解措施

          緩解 描述
          審計(M1047) 使用諸如Bloodhound(1.5.1版及更高版本)之類的審核工具來識別和糾正GPO權限濫用機會(例如:GPO修改特權)。
          用戶帳號管理(M1018) 考慮實施WMI和安全篩選,以進一步調整GPO將應用于哪些用戶和計算機。
          Mitigation Description
          Audit(M1047) Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later).
          User Account Management(M1018) Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply

          檢測

          通過使用Windows事件日志監視目錄服務更改,可以檢測GPO修改。此類GPO修改可能會記錄多個事件,包括:

          • 事件ID 5136-目錄服務對象已被修改
          • 事件ID 5137-目錄服務對象已創建
          • 事件ID 5138-未刪除目錄服務對象
          • 事件ID 5139-目錄服務對象已移動
          • 事件ID 5141-目錄服務對象已刪除

          GPO濫用通常會伴隨一些其他行為,例如“ 計劃任務”(T1053),該行為將與之關聯的事件得以檢測。也可以在與分配給新登錄的特權(事件ID 4672)和用戶權限的分配(事件ID 4704)相關的事件中搜索與SeEnableDelegationPrivilege相同的后續許可權值修改。

          It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:

          • Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified
          • Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created
          • Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted
          • Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved
          • Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted

          GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as Scheduled Task(T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).

          欧美日韩国产亚洲,天天射影院,大芭蕉天天视频在线观看,欧美肥老太牲交大片,奇米色888,黄三级高清在线播放,国产卡一卡二卡三卡四,亚洲第一黄色视频 日韩中文字幕中文有码,日本A级作爱片一,奇米第四,三级片短片视频免费在线观看,奇米网狠狠网,影音先锋色AV男人资源网,日本丰满熟妇hd 日本日韩中文字幕无区码,涩 色 爱 性,天天射影视,中文字幕制服丝袜第57页,777米奇影院奇米网狠狠,尤物TV国产精品看片在线,欧洲女同牲恋牲交视频 久久AV天堂日日综合,亚洲性爱影院色yeye,日韩亚洲欧美Av精品,十八禁全身裸露全彩漫画,奇米网影视,人人爽人人澡人人人妻,动漫AV专区,天天色综合影院 日韩精品中文字幕,特级无码毛片免费视频,人妻少妇不卡无码视频,制服丝袜有码中文字幕在线,深爱激动情网婷婷,影音先锋全部色先锋,香港三级日本三级韩级人妇 日韩欧美亚洲综合久久在线视频,2021XX性影院,玖玖资源站最稳定网址,日韩亚洲制服丝袜中文字幕,国产超碰人人模人人爽人人喊,先锋色熟女丝袜资源 很黄特别刺激又免费的视频,2021一本久道在线线观看,色中娱乐黄色大片,日本高清不卡在线观看播放,97国产自在现线免费视频,国产在线精品亚洲第一区 免费中文字幕精品一区二区 视频,狠狠爱俺也色,天天好逼网,日韩制服丝袜,国产女人大象蕉视频在线观看,国产 精品 自在 线免费,午夜时刻在线观看