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          ATT&CK-CN V1.01 Last Update: 2019-11 [返回索引頁]

          譯者: 林妙倩(清華大學網絡研究院網絡空間安全實習生)、戴亦侖(賽寧網安) 原創翻譯作品,如果需要轉載請取得翻譯作者同意。

          數據來源:ATT&CK Matrices

          原文: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497

          術語表: /attack/glossary

          繞過虛擬化/沙盒

          攻擊者可能會檢查是否存在虛擬機環境(VME)或沙箱,以避免潛在地檢測到工具和活動。如果對手檢測到VME,他們可能會更改其惡意軟件以隱藏植入物的核心功能或與受害者分離。他們還可能在丟棄次要或其他有效載荷之前搜索VME工件。攻擊者可能會在自動發現過程中使用從虛擬化/沙盒逃避中學到的信息來塑造后續行為。

          攻擊者可以通過搜索安全監視工具(例如Sysinternals,Wireshark等)來使用包括安全軟件發現在內的多種方法來完成虛擬化/沙盒逃避,以幫助確定其是否為分析環境。其他方法包括在惡意軟件代碼中使用睡眠計時器或循環,以避免在臨時沙箱中進行操作

          Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

          Adversaries may check for the presence of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox to avoid potential detection of tools and activities. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to conceal the core functions of the implant or disengage from the victim. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information from learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

          Adversaries may use several methods including Security Software Discovery to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion by searching for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) to help determine if it is an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandboxes.

          虛擬機環境工件發現

          攻擊者可能使用 Windows Management Instrumentation,PowerShell,Systeminfo和Query Registry之類的實用程序來獲取系統信息并搜索VME工件。對手可能會在內存,進程,文件系統和/或注冊表中搜索VME工件。攻擊者可以使用腳本(T1064)將這些檢查合并為一個腳本,然后在確定系統為虛擬環境時退出程序。而且,在VMWare之類的應用程序中,對手可以使用特殊的I / O端口發送命令并接收輸出。對手也可能會檢查驅動器的大小。例如,可以使用Win32 DeviceIOControl函數來完成。

          注冊表中的VME工件示例

          • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions
          • HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System\"SystemBiosVersion";"VMWARE"
          • HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\BOX_

          系統上的示例VME文件和DLL

          • WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys
          • WINDOWS\system32\vboxhook.dll
          • Windows\system32\vboxdisp.dll

          常規檢查可能枚舉這些應用程序所獨有的正在運行的服務,系統上已安裝的程序,與虛擬機應用程序有關的字符串的制造商/產品字段以及特定于VME的硬件/處理器指令。

          Adversaries may use utilities such as Windows Management Instrumentation,PowerShell,Systeminf and theQuery Registry to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use Scripting(T1064) to combine these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Also, in applications like VMWare, adversaries can use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Adversaries may also check the drive size. For example, this can be done using the Win32 DeviceIOControl function.

          Example VME Artifacts in the Registry

          • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions
          • HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System\"SystemBiosVersion";"VMWARE"
          • HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\BOX_

          Example VME files and DLLs on the system

          • WINDOWS\system32\drivers\vmmouse.sys
          • WINDOWS\system32\vboxhook.dll
          • Windows\system32\vboxdisp.dll

          Common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions

          用戶活動發現

          攻擊者可以在主機上搜索用戶活動(例如,瀏覽器歷史記錄,緩存,書簽,主目錄中的文件數等),以確保真實環境的安全。他們可能會通過用戶交互和數字簽名來檢測此類信息。他們可能會讓惡意軟件檢查鼠標單擊的速度和頻率,以確定是否是沙盒環境。在激活惡意代碼之前,其他方法可能依賴于特定的用戶與系統的交互。示例包括在激活宏之前等待文檔關閉[以及等待用戶雙擊嵌入式圖像以激活。

          Adversaries may search for user activity on the host (e.g., browser history, cache, bookmarks, number of files in the home directories, etc.) for reassurance of an authentic environment. They might detect this type of information via user interaction and digital signatures. They may have malware check the speed and frequency of mouse clicks to determine if it’s a sandboxed environment. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated. Examples include waiting for a document to close before activating a macro and waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate

          虛擬硬件指紋發現

          攻擊者可以檢查系統的風扇和溫度,以收集可以指示虛擬環境的證據。攻擊者可以使用WMI查詢執行CPU檢查$q = "Select * from Win32_Fan" Get-WmiObject -Query $q。如果WMI查詢的結果返回的元素多于零,則可能告訴他們該機器是一臺物理機器。

          Adversaries may check the fan and temperature of the system to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. An adversary may perform a CPU check using a WMI query $q = "Select * from Win32_Fan" Get-WmiObject -Query $q. If the results of the WMI query return more than zero elements, this might tell them that the machine is a physical one

          標簽

          ID編號: T1497

          策略: 防御閃避,披露

          平臺: Windows,macOS

          數據源: 流程監視,流程命令行參數

          繞過防御: 防病毒,主機取證分析,基于簽名的檢測,靜態文件分析

          緩解措施

          這種攻擊技術無法通過預防性控制輕松緩解,因為它基于濫用系統功能。

          This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

          檢測

          虛擬化,沙箱和相關的發現技術可能會在操作的第一步中發生,但也可能會在對手學習環境時始終出現。數據和事件不應孤立地看待,而應作為行為鏈的一部分,根據所獲得的信息,這些行為和行為可能導致其他活動,例如橫向運動。根據對手的實施和所需的監控,檢測與虛擬化和沙箱識別相關的動作可能很困難。監視生成的可疑進程,這些進程收集各種系統信息或執行其他形式的披露(尤其是在很短的時間內),可能有助于檢測。

          Virtualization, sandbox, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery(TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.

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